The effects of dispersion in the communication channel on the secrecy of a quantum cryptosystem based on single photon states with different frequencies are studied. A maximum communication channel length which can still ensure the secrecy of the key generation procedure is found.
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The main purpose of cryptography is to allow the exchange of secret information among two or more legitimate users. The basic element of every cryptosystem is the key, i.e. a random sequence of units and zeros used to code the messages [1] . The communication can be shown to be absolutely secret if the key length equals the message length and the key is used only once [2] . Therefore, the major task is to ensure the secrecy of the key distribution procedure among the legitimate users. In the standard cryptosystem there is no fundamental principle which could guarantee the detection of any eavesdropping attempt at the key distribution stage; thus the cryptosystem secrecy is based on the key complexity rather than fundamental laws of nature [1] .
On the other hand, quantum cryptography provides a key distribution procedures where the possibility of detecting any eavesdropping attempt is guaranteed by the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics.
As a rule, the secrecy of quantum cryptosystems is proved for ideal communication channels. However, the imperfections of a communication channel should generally reduce the secrecy of the key generation procedure so that any practical cryptosystem should carefully take into account the actual properties of the communication channel employed.
Recently, several new quantum cryptosystems have been proposed [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . One of these systems, based on phase coding and employing a 30 km long fiber line as an interferometer arm has been realized experimentally [9] .
In the paper [10] a quantum cryptosystem based on the EPR (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) effect for biphoton states has been proposed. Actually, a similar scheme can be implemented with single-photon states, which is much simpler from the experimental point of view since it does not involve generation of biphoton states (e.g., with the parametric down-conversion).
In addition, such a scheme should be much more stable, since it does not employ a long-arm interferometer.
The secrecy of this cryptosystem (detection of eavesdropping attempts) is based on the fundamental time-energy uncertainty relation. The scheme proposed in [10] did not take into account attenuation and dispersion in the communication channel which could severely hamper its practical realization. The purpose of the present paper is to find out the conditions under which it is possible to ensure the secrecy of the cryptosystem in the presence of attenuation and dispersion.
Let us first describe the key generation procedure which does not involve the biphoton states. The user A sends at random into the communication channel (optical fiber) to user B on of the following three single-photon states: one of the two states with narrow frequency spectra centered around well defined frequencies ω 1 and ω 2 (frequency spectra widths σ 1 , σ 2 ≪ |ω 1 −ω 2 |) or a well localized in time (correspondingly, with a wide frequency spectrum of width σ ∞ ) at a carry frequency ω 0 ≈ ω 1,2 . Actually, the optical fiber transparency window corresponds to the wavelength λ ≈ 1.3 µm (frequencies ω 0,1,2 ≈ 10 15 s −1 ). According to the fundamental time-energy uncertainty relation, sending a signal with a well-defined frequency ω 1 or ω 2 means that the moments of times when the photon leaves user A (t A ) and is registered by user B (t B ) exhibit a large scatter ∆t A,B ≥ 1/σ 1,2 .
If a broad-spectrum photon is emitted, although the associated uncertainty in frequency σ ∞ is large, the corresponding state can be prepared rather fast and the photon emission and detection times can be measured with high accuracy (∆t
To register a photon, user B choses randomly and independently of user A in each measurement either one of the narrow-band photodetectors with central frequencies ω 1 and ω 2 and bandwidths γ 1,2 ≈ σ 1,2 , or a wide-band photodetector with the central frequency ω 0 and bandwidth γ ∞ ≈ σ ∞ . The frequency separation δω 12 = |ω 1 − ω 2 | should not be less than the sum σ 1 + σ 2 if the photons with frequencies ω 1 and ω 2 should be distinguished. For a gaussian spectrum the inequality δω 12 > 3(σ 1 + σ 2 ) is sufficient.
Measurements with a narrow-band photodetector allow to distinguish between ω 1 and ω 2 , but they cannot be performed in a time shorter than 1/δω 12 (the same is also true for the minimal time required to prepare these states).
Measurements with a wide-band photodetector can be completed during the time interval ∆t ∞ ≈ 1/σ ∞ → 0, but they cannot determine the photon energy with the accuracy better than σ ∞ . Users A and B choose the cryptosystem parameters to satisfy the inequality ∆t ∞ ≪ ∆t 12 .
(1)
After a series of measurements user B announces through a public channel which type of the photodetector (wide-or narrow-band) was used in each measurement, but does not disclose which particular frequency ω 1 or ω 2 ) was used in the case of a narrow-band photodetector. Those measurements where the photodetector did not fire or the photodetector type differed from the type of the single-photon signal, are discarded. The remaining measurements where narrow-band photodetectors were used yield a random sequence of zeros and units (ω 1 corresponds to zero and ω 2 to unit) shared by the two users which can be used as a key. The probability of an error (e.g., obtaining zero instead of unit) is negligibly small if δω 12 > 3(σ 1 + σ 2 ). To correct the key one can use a privacy amplification scheme proposed by Bennett et al [11] .
Measurements where short pulses were used (i.e., the photon emission and registration times are known with high accuracy) allow to detect any eavesdropping attempt. For all such measurements users A and B announce through a public channel the photon emission (t A ) and registration (t B ) times. Then the expected delay time t A − t B = const (to within ∆t ∞ ≈ 1/σ ∞ → 0) is calculated from the known line length. Any systematic deviation of t A − t b from the expected delay time means the presence of an eavesdropper. Indeed, to extract the information about the key, the eavesdropper should be able to distinguish between ω 1 and ω 2 (0 or 1); therefore, he should employ narrow-band photodetectors. Such measurements (as well as preparation of narrow-band signals centered around ω 1 and ω 2 to be sent by the eavesdropper to user B) cannot be performed faster than in ∆t 12 ≈ 1/δω 12 ≫ ∆t ∞ . The eavesdropper will unavoidably run into the situation where user A sent a short signal, while the eavesdropper uses a narrow-band photodetector (since the user A chooses the type of signal he sends to user B at random) and re-sends to user B a signal with a well-defined frequency. The eaves dropper must re-send the photon to user B since otherwise this measurement will be discarded because the photodetector would not fire. Therefore, a systematic deviation of t A − t B from the expected delay time by not less than ∆t 12 ≈ 1/δω 12 , which is much larger than the accuracy with which the delay time t A − t B is known.
Up to this moment we did not take into account attenuation and dispersion of the quantum communication channel. Practically, a fiber cable is used as channel which implies that short pulses sent by user A would experience broadening (signal width at the receiving end of the line is expected to be enhanced) so that the scatter in the photon registration time by user B is increased simplifying the task of the eavesdropper and reducing the cryptosystem security.
Our purpose is find out the relationships between the single-photon states parameters σ 1,2 , δω 1,2 , σ ∞ , and the communication channel attenuation and dispersion which still allow a secret key distribution procedure.
Let the user A prepare a single-photon state at the input of the communication channel (point x = 0) with the spectral width σ (which is one of σ 1,2,∞ ) and the carry frequency ω 0 (for definiteness we assume that ω 0 = ω 1,2 , although this is not essential)
The effective pulse duration at the channel input is
and its spectral width is
Actually, even for a short pulse with t ≈ 10 −12 s the spectral width is relatively small (carry frequency ω 0 ≈ 10 15 s −1 ), so that only quadratic terms can be retained in the expansion of the wavevector as a function of frequency [12, 13] :
where α and β are generally complex constants, their real and imaginary parts describing dispersion and attenuation, respectively. Let us first assume that the attenuation is absent. The signal (2) at the point x (user B) takes the form
The field intensity observed by user B is
The effective spectral width of the signal at point x remains the same as at the channel input (remember that the attenuation is not taken into account)
The effective pulse duration at the receiving end of the channel is increased by a factor of
This time ∆t B is the mean time taken by the wave packet to pass through the point x, while the inequality
is a variety of the Mandelstam-Tamm inequality [14] . Equation (10) describes the statistics of (potential) measurements performed on a particle, rather than an actual measurement of a photon observable so that it cannot be interpreted as a time-energy uncertainty relation relevant to a real act of measurement (which is described by the Bohr uncertainty principle; see a detailed discussion in the paper by Krylov and Fock [16] ). We shall adhere to the orthodox point of view assuming the time-energy uncertainty relation is a fundamental law of nature (various point of view are discussed in a review article by Dodonov and Man'ko [17] ). The average time taken by the wave packet to pass through the point x has nothing to do with the measurement time δt which is arbitrarily chosen by the experimentalist. The Bohr uncertainty relation is applicable to a real act of measurement (e.g. passage of a particle through a device shutter which unavoidably changes the particle energy in an uncontrollable way)
where ∆E is the scatter of measured energy [17] . Unlike the Mandelstam-Tamm relation which is derived from the evolution governed by the Schrödinger equation [14] , the Bohr uncertainty relation is actually a postulate since the measurement act cannot be described by the Schrödinger equation. Thus, to register a photon with the spectrum width σ ∞ user B should open the shutter for a time interval at least (1 + β 2 x 2 σ 4 ∞ ) 1/2 /σ ∞ long. Of course, user B could open the shutter for arbitrarily short time, but in that case he would not be able to systematically detect a photon: Although in some rare measurements he would still register a photon even if the shutter were only open during δt → 0, the fraction of such measurements should tend to zero or otherwise the Bohr time-energy uncertainty relation [15] would be violated.
Let us now find out when the quantum cryptosystem still remains secret, i.e. the scatter in the short pulse registration times by user B ∆t B should be substantially less than the time taken by the eavesdropper (at the location x somewhere between A and B) to register the photon with a narrow-band photodetector, which, as described above, could not be shorter than
The inequality ∆t B ≪ ∆t E (13)
imposes the following limit on the channel length:
The worst situation with respect to the system secrecy occurs if the eavesdropper is located close to the user A (x E ≈ 0). In that case the eavesdropper is not affected by the pulse broadening.
Therefore, the maximum channel length is
Thus, the smaller is the frequency separation between the information-carrying signals ω 1 and ω 2 , the shorter is the reference pulse (the wider is its frequency spectrum), and the lower is the dispersion quadratic coefficient, the larger is the allowed quantum communication channel length still preserving the system secrecy. However, this inequality does not impose any absolute restrictions on the channel length. Formally, the channel length can be made arbitrarily large at the price of reducing the frequency separation δω 12 = |ω 1 − ω 2 |. Let us now make some numerical estimates. For a frequency separation δω 12 = |ω 1 − ω 2 | ≈ 10 9 Hz corresponding to the linewidth of a rather average semiconductor laser, the short pulse duration of 1 ps (σ ∞ ≈ 10 12 Hz), and a typical quadratic dispersion coefficient β ≈ 1 ps 2 /km [18] , one has for the allowed channel length The role of attenuation reduces to the following two effects. First, the fraction of measurements where the photodetector employed by user B did not fire is increased. This effect reduces the system efficiency but does not affect its secrecy. The second effect is the renormalization of dispersion. Now the restriction on the channel length becomes
for weak attenuation x B ≤ 1
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